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1 Introduction
In 1972 the UK government oated the pound while pursuing highly expansionary scal policies whose aim
was to reduce rising unemployment. To control ination the government introduced statutory wage and
price controls. Monetary policy was given no targets for either the money supply or ination; interest
rates were held at rates that would accommodate growth and falling unemployment. Since wage and
price controls would inevitably break down faced with the inationary e¤ects of such policies, this period
appears to t rather well with the policy requirements of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: scal
policy appears to have been non-Ricardian (not limited by concerns with solvency) and monetary policy
accommodative to ination - in the language of Leeper (1991) scal policy was activeand monetary
policy was passive. Furthermore, there was no reason to believe that this policy regime would come to
an end: both Conservative and Labour parties won elections in the 1970s and both pursued essentially the
same policies. While Margaret Thatcher won the Conservative leadership in 1975 and also the election
in 1979, during the period we study here it was not assumed that the monetarist policies she advocated
would ever occur, since they were opposed by the two other parties, by a powerful group in her own
party, as well as by the senior civil service. Only after her election and her actual implementation of
them was this a reasonable assumption. So it appears that in the period 1972-79 there was a prevailing
policy regime which was expected to continue. These are key assumptions about the policy environment;
besides this narrative background we also check them empirically below.
Under FTPL the price level or ination is determined by the need to impose scal solvency; thus it
is set at the value necessary for the governments intertemporal budget constraint to hold at the market
value of outstanding debt. Given this determinate price level, money supply growth, interest rates and
output are determined recursively as the values required by the rest of the model to permit this price
level.
The theory implies a relationship between the trend in the level of ination and trends in scal
variables. This relationship can be tested by cointegration analysis in a familiar way. Indirect Inference,
less familiarly, can be used to evaluate the models dynamics by checking whether its simulated dynamic
behaviour is consistent with the data. The data under Indirect Inference is described by some time-series
equation. The models simulated behaviour implies a range of time-series behaviour depending on the
shocks hitting it; this range can be described by the parameters of the same time-series equation that ts
the data. We can derive the implied statistical joint distribution for the parameters of this equation and
test whether the parameters of the time-series equation from the data lie jointly within this distribution
at some condence level.
The FTPL has been set out and developed in Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 1997), Woodford (1996,
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1998, 2001), and Cochrane (2000, 2001) - see also comments by McCallum (2001,2003), Buiter (1999,
2002), and for surveys Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) and Christiano and
Fitzgerald (2000). Empirical tests have been proposed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), Bohn
(1998), Cochrane (1999) and Woodford (1999), Davig et al (2007).
In particular Loyo (2000) argues that Brazilian policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s was non-
Ricardian and that the FTPL provides a persuasive explanation for Brazils high ination during that
time. The work of Tanner and Ramos (2003) also nds evidence of scal dominance for the case of Brazil
for some important periods. Cochrane (1999, 2000) argues that the FTPL with a statistically exogenous
surplus process explains the dynamics of U.S. ination in the 1970s. This appears to be similar to what
we see in the UK during the 1970s.
With scal policy of this type, the nancial markets - forced to price the resulting supplies of govern-
ment bonds - will take a view about future ination and set interest rates and bond prices accordingly.
It will set bond prices so that the governments solvency is assured ex post (i.e. in equilibrium); thus it
will be ensuring that buyers of the bonds are paying a fair price. Future ination is expected because if
the bonds were priced at excessive value then consumers would have wealth to spend, in that their bonds
would be worth more than their future tax liabilities; this would generate excess demand which would
drive up ination. However this mechanism would only come into play out of equilibrium. We would not
observe it because markets anticipate it and so drive interest rates and expected ination up in advance;
ination follows because of the standard Phillips Curve mechanism by which workers and rms raise
ination in line with expected ination. Thus the FTPL can be regarded as a particular policy regime
within a sequence of di¤erent policy regimes.
Our aim in this paper is to test the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) as applied to the
UK in the 1970s episode we described above. Cochrane (1998, 2000, and 2001) has noted that there
is a basic identication problem a¤ecting the FTPL: in the FTPL scal policy is exogenous and forces
ination to close the government constraint while monetary policy is endogenous and responds to that
given ination; but the same economic behaviour can be consistent with an exogenous monetary policy
determining ination in the normal way, with Ricardian scal policy endogenously responding to the
government budget constraint to ensure solvency given that ination path. Hence testing either or both
models is not straightforward. Our procedure is in two stages. In the rst stage we identify which model
set-up is operating with tests of exogeneity for the two policy regimes: we test for and do not reject,
both the endogeneity of monetary policy and the exogeneity of scal policy. In the second stage we go on
to test whether the FTPL can account for the behaviour of ination in terms of the behaviour of scal
variables alone; we do so rst by testing for the trend cointegrating relationship and secondly carrying
out a test for the dynamic relationship.
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Our paper is organised as follows. We review the history of UK policy during the 1970s in section 2;
in this section we establish a narrative that in our view plainly supports the exogeneity features required
for the FTPL to be identied. In section 3 we set up the model of FTPL for this UK episode. In section
4 we discuss the data and test the two key policy exogeneity/endogeneity assumptions of the theory
econometrically. In section 5 we carry out the cointegration test for the ination trend. In section 6 we
explain and carry out the indirect inference tests for the dynamics of ination. In section 7 we discuss
what evidence our model throws on other dynamic factors a¤ecting ination that are included via the
models error term. Section 8 concludes.
2 The nature of UK policy during the 1970s
From WWII until its breakdown in 1970 the Bretton Woods system governed the UK exchange rate and
hence its monetary policy. While exchange controls gave some moderate freedom to manage interest rates
away from foreign rates without the policy being overwhelmed by capital movements, such freedom was
mainly only for the short term; the setting of interest rates was dominated in the longer term by the need
to control the balance of payments su¢ ciently to hold the sterling exchange rate. Pegging the exchange
rate implied that the price level was also pegged to the foreign price level. Through this mechanism
monetary policy ensured price level determinacy. Fiscal policy was therefore disciplined by the inability
to shift the price level from this trajectory and also by the consequent xing of the home interest rate to
the foreign level. While this discipline could in principle be overthrown by scal policy forcing a series
of devaluations, the evidence suggests that this did not happen; there were just two devaluations during
the whole post-war period up to 1970, in 1949 and 1967. On both occasions a Labour government viewed
the devaluation as a one-o¤ change permitting a brief period of monetary and scal ease, to be followed
by a return to the previous regime.
However, after the collapse of Bretton Woods, the UK moved in a series of steps to a oating exchange
rate. Initially sterling was xed to continental currencies through a European exchange rate system known
as the snake in the tunnel, designed to hold rates within a general range (the tunnel) and if possible
even closer (the snake). Sterling proved di¢ cult to keep within these ranges, and was in practice kept
within a range against the dollar and an e¤ective(currency basket) rate. Finally it was formally oated
in June 1972.
UK monetary policy was not given a new nominal target to replace the exchange rate. Instead the
Conservative government of Edward Heath assigned the determination of ination to wage and price
controls. A statutory incomes policywas introduced in late 1972. After the 1974 election the incoming
Labour government set up a voluntary incomes policy, buttressed by food subsidies and cuts in indirect
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tax rates. Fiscal policy was expansionary until 1975 and monetary policy was accommodative, with
interest rates kept low to encourage falling unemployment. In 1976 the Labour government invited the
IMF to stabilise the falling sterling exchange rate; the IMF terms included the setting of targets for
Domestic Credit Expansion. These were largely met by a form of control on deposits (the corset) which
forced banks to reduce deposits in favour of other forms of liability. But by 1978 these restraints had
e¤ectively been abandoned and prices and incomes controls reinstated in the context of a pre-election
scal and monetary expansion - see Minford (1993), Nelson (2003) and Meenagh et al (2009b) for further
discussions of the UK policy environment for this and other post-war UK periods.
Our description of policy suggests that the role of the nominal anchor for ination will have been
played during the 1970s by scal policy, if only because monetary policy was not given this task and was
purely accommodative.
3 The FTPL Model for the UK in the 1970s
We assume that the UK nances its decit by issuing nominal perpetuities, each paying one pound
per period and whose present value is therefore 1Rtwhere Rt is the long-term rate of interest. We use
perpetuities here rather than the usual one-period bond because of the preponderance of long-term bonds
in the UK debt issue: the average maturity of UK debt at this time was approximately ten years. All
bonds at this time were nominal (indexed bonds were not issued until 1981).
The government budget constraint can then be written as
(1) Bt+1Rt = Gt   Tt +Bt + BtRt
where Gt is government spending in money terms, Tt is government taxation in money terms, Bt is
the number of perpetuities issued. Note that when perpetuities are assumed the debt interest in period
t is Bt while the stock of debt at the start of period t has the value during the period of BtRt ; end-period
debt therefore has the value Bt+1Rt : Note too the perpetuity interest rate is by construction expected to
remain constant into the future.
We can derive the implied value of current bonds outstanding by substituting forwards for future
bonds outstanding:
(2) BtRt = Et
P1
i=0 (Tt+i  Gt+i) 1(1+Rt)i+1
We represent this equation in terms of each periods expected permanenttax and spending share, tt
and gt, and assume that EtTt+i = ttEtPt+iyt+i and EtGt+i = gtEtPt+iyt+i:
We can then simplify (2) (see Appendix B) to:
(3) BtRtPtyt =
tt gt
(1+t+)(rt )
where Rt = rt + t (respectively the perpetuity real interest rate and perpetuity ination rate, both
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permanentvariables),  is the permanentgrowth rate of real GDP . All these expected permanent
variables are by construction expected to be constant in the future at todays level. Permanent growth
in this period we assume to be constant so that output (which is an I(1) variable during this period) is
assumed to be a random walk with constant drift equal to :
In the case of ination we impose on the model the simplifying assumption that it is a random walk,
so that future expected ination is equal to current ination and is also therefore permanent ination.
Notice that in the rest of the model we have equations for output and real interest rates, in the IS and
Phillips Curves; but these cannot determine ination as well. Hence if ination had some dynamic time-
path other than the random walk we would have to determine it exogenously; we choose the random walk
for simplicity, on the basis that the o¤-equilibrium wealth e¤ect would operate so powerfully on excess
demand that it would drive ination at once to its permanent value.
The pricing condition on bonds in equation (3) thus sets their value consistently with expected future
primary surpluses. Suppose now the government reduces the present value of future primary surpluses. At
an unchanged real value of the debt this would be a non-Ricardianscal policy move. According to the
FTPL prices will adjust to reduce the real value of the debt to ensure the government budget constraint
holds and thus the solvency condition is met. This is to be compared with the normal Ricardian situation,
in which scal surpluses are endogenous so that scal shocks today lead to adjustments in future surpluses,
the price level remaining una¤ected.
Since the pricing equation sets the ratio of debt value to GDP equal to a function of permanent
variables, it follows that this ratio bt follows a random walk 1 such that:
(4) bt = BtRtPtyt = Etbt+1 and (5) bt = t, an i:i:d:process.
This in turn allows us to solve for the ination shock as a function of other shocks (especially shocks to
government tax and spending). With the number of government bonds issued, Bt; being pre-determined
(issued last period) and therefore known at t 1, equation (3) could be written as follows (taking logs
and letting log xuet = log xt   Et 1 log xt, the unexpected change in log xt)
(6) log buet =   logRuet   logPuet   log yuet [LHS of equation (3)]
= log (tt   gt)ue   log (1 + t + )ue   log(rt   )ue [RHS of equation (3)]
With all the variables in the equation dened to follow a random walk, we can rewrite the above
expression as (note that for small  log (1 + t + )
ue  uet = logPuet )
(7)   log (t + rt ) =  log(tt   gt)  log(rt   )
Using a rst-order Taylor Series expansion around the sample means we can obtain a solution for t
1A permanentvariable xt is by denition a variable expected not to change in the future so that
Et xt+1 = xt
Thus xt+1 = xt + t+1
where t+1 is an iid error making the process a random walk.
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as a function of change in government expenditure and tax rates
(8) t = (gt  tt) + t
where t = r

t ; =
+r
t g ;  =
+
r  ; ; r
; t and g are mean values of the corresponding variables.
The term t = r

t is treated as an error term because we cannot observe r

t though we know it is a
random walk and hence its rst di¤erence is random.
We can now complete the DSGE model as in Meenagh et al (2009a), by adding a forward-looking
IS curve, derived in the usual way from the household Euler equations and the goods market-clearing
condition, and a New Classical Phillips Curve (which we have found in Meenagh et al, op. cit., to come
closest to accounting for UK ination over the post-war period other than this episode):
(9) (yt   yt ) =  (rt   rt ) + Et(yt+1   yt+1) + vt
(10) t = Et 1t + (yt   yt ) + ut
Since ination follows a random walk by assumption (so that expected ination is simply lagged
ination), we can now establish from these two equations that:
(11) yt = yt +
1
 (t   ut)
(12) rt = rt   1 (t   ut) + 1vt   Etut+1
Thus both output and real interest rates are stationary processes around their natural rates. Both
ut and vt may be serially correlated. Our full model consists of (8), (9) and (10).
4 Data, estimation and exogeneity testing
4.1 Time series properties of the data
We begin with some notes on the time-series behaviour of ination and the other macro variables we are
dealing with for this period (1970q4-1978q4). Table 1 shows that ination, output, interest rates and
money supply (M4) growth are all I(1).
Unit Root Tests t yt Rt Mt
Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF Test Statistic -2.107 -5.218 -0.906 -2.165 -1.952 -4.782 -3.177 -6.058
(0.243) (0.000)** (0.772) (0.031)* (0.605) (0.000)** (0.108) (0.000)**
PP Test Statistic -2.127 -7.561 -1.104 -2.322 -2.129 -4.666 -3.010 -8.591
(0.236) (0.000)** (0.702) (0.022)* (0.511) (0.000)** (0.146) (0.000)**
Table 1: Test for Non-Stationarity
Notes on Table: MacKinnons critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root: values in
parentheses are p-values, while *, ** indicate signicance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Number
of lags in the ADF test is set upon AIC criterion and PP test upon Newey-West bandwidth.
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We now go on to estimate the best tting ARMA for the ination rst di¤erence. Starting with
ARMA (0,0), we raise the order of the AR and MA each by one, and apply an F -test to test the
validity of the lower order restriction. We nd that any ARMA coe¢ cients added to a random walk are
insignicant, suggesting that UK ination rst di¤erence, t, may well simply be ARMA (0,0), a pure
random walk. However, of course it is also possible the dynamics are more complex, even if we cannot
reject the simple random walk at the 5% level. We show below how the AIC varies as one raises the
order- Table 2. The approach we take to the dynamics of t is to examine all these ARMA equations
(except order 3,3 whose MA roots lie outside the unit circle), in order to achieve robustness in the face
of possibly more complex dynamics.
AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) MA(1) MA(2) MA(3) AIC R
2
ARMA(0,0) - - - - - - -6.261 0.000
ARMA(1,1) -0.371 - - 0.512 - - -6.138 -0.009
ARMA(1,2) 0.270 - - -0.296 -0.310 - -6.185 0.065
ARMA(1,3) -0.403 - - 0.664 -0.351 -0.791 -6.280 0.174
ARMA(2,0) 0.056 -0.360 - - - - -6.213 0.097
ARMA(2,1) 0.382 -0.367 - -0.393 - - -6.173 0.088
ARMA(2,2) 0.421 -0.463 - -0.441 0.115 - -6.110 0.097
ARMA(2,3) -0.666 -0.312 - 0.859 -0.020 -0.597 -6.251 0.203
ARMA(3,0) -0.003 -0.374 -0.160 - - - -6.179 0.103
ARMA(3,1) -0.835 -0.333 -0.458 0.952 - - -6.186 0.135
ARMA(3,2) -0.955 -0.432 -0.449 1.094 0.131 - -6.119 0.101
ARMA(3,3)* -0.599 -0.482 0.377 1.565 0.738 -1.814 -7.356 0.746
Table 2: ARMA Regressions:*=AR or MA roots outside unit circle
The scal variables, G=GDP and T=GDP , are shown in Figure 1. G=GDP is non-stationary: both
the ADF and PP test suggest that it follows a pure random walk (Table 3), which implies that its current
value is also its trend or permanent value, gt. T=GDP is stationary around its mean with no signicant
deterministic trend; hence its trend or permanent value, tt, is simply a constant. We conclude that
government expenditure is the only driving force for ination that we can observe in the data.2
2For model convergence, the amount of government expenditure is required be less than taxation for government bonds
to have a positive value. We note that since government expenditure of a capital variety is expected to produce future
returns in line with real interest rates, we should deduct the trend in such spending from the trend in g (derived from the
data shown in the Figure 1). To implement this we assume that the average share of expenditure in the period devoted to
xed capital, health and education can be regarded as the (constant) trend in such capital spending; of course the capital
element in total government spending is essentially unobservable and hence our assumption is intended merely to adjust
the level of the g trend in an approximate way but not its movement over time which we regard as accurately capturing
changes in current spending. The adjustment for these is of the order of 10% of GDP.
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Figure 1: The patterns of government expenditure rate G/GDP and tax rate T/GDP.
Unit Root Tests G=GDP T=GDP
Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF Test Statistic -0.814 -8.393 -2.180 -
(0.953) (0.000)** (0.030)* -
PP Test Statistic -1.576 -8.410 -3.379 -
(0.780) (0.000)** ( 0.001)** -
Table 3: Test for Non-Stationarity of deseasonalised government expenditure and tax rates
Notes on Table: MacKinnons critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root: values in
parentheses are p-values, while *, ** indicate signicance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Number
of lags in the ADF test is set upon AIC criterion and PP test upon Newey-West bandwidth.
4.1.1 Endogeneity of Money Supply
Our focus is on M4, as M0 is generally agreed to have been supplied on demand during this period and
indeed generally since WWII. The question therefore we ask here is whether M4 responds to the lagged
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behaviour of ination, output and interest rates, all of which should enter the demand for money; we did
not attempt to estimate a stable demand for money function as this has proved elusive (see for instance
Fisher and Vega (1993), Astley and Haldane (1995), Fiess and MacDonald (2001)). However our aim is
narrower: to check on whether M4 responds to these minimum determinants. We found that the growth
of M4 was I(1); other I(1) variables were ination, the log of output, and the level of interest rates. Thus
we checked an equation in the rst di¤erences of these variables, relating the change in M4 growth to
the lagged changes in ination, in output and in interest rates - Table 4. One can see that this equation
nds highly signicant feedback of money growth to these determinants.3
We also nd below- section 7- that there is no e¤ect of lagged money growth on the error in our
model. Thus there is evidence here that money growth is endogenous.
Dependent Variable 2Mt
Variable coe¢ cient(std. error)
constant -0.000(0.001)
t 1 -0.117(0.157)
yt 1 0.133(0.048)**
Rt 1 -0.484(0.109)**
F -test on joint signicance (p-value) 0.000**
S.E.of regression 0.01
Misspecication tests (p-values)
F -AR 0.13
F -ARCH 0.12
Normality 0.40
F -Het 0.41
Table 4: Money endogeneity test -standard errors in parenthesis: **=signicant at 1
Notes to table: Misspecication tests are carried out. F -AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F -test for
residual serial correlation up to forth order. F -ARCH is an F -test for autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity. Norm is normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque test for residuals non-normality. F -Het is
3 It might be suggested that a test should be made for whether there is an interest rate setting, Taylor rule in this period.
However, as noted by Minford et al (2002), a Taylor rule equation is not identied on its own, since a variety of full models
imply an equation indistinguishable from it. For example with the FTPL model here we can substitute (12) into the Fisher
identity for the short-term interest rate Rst = rt + Ett+1 using that ination is a random walk to obtain Ett+1 = t
and we obtain Rst = rt + Ett+1 = t + rt   1 (t   ut) + 1vt   Etut+1. The long-run cointegrating relationship
here gives a unit coe¢ cient on ination plus a relationship with the natural real rate; dynamics add further relationships
with ination both directly and via the two errorscorrelation with ination. Hence after detrending one will obtain some
relationship between interest rates and ination; this cannot be distinguished from the Taylor rule family of relationships.
One can achieve identication by specifying a full alternative DSGE model with a Taylor rule. This could be tested by
indirect inference in the manner of this paper (Minford and Ou, 2009, do this for the US data post-1984); however, there
are di¢ culties in specifying a Taylor rule for this period as it would need to permit very high annual rates of ination (up
to 50%) in the mid-1970s. Some, eg Nelson (2003), have argued that the correct rule would imply indeterminacy, hence
a sunspot solution. Since the sunspot can be any number and has innite variance, a model that includes it is simply
untestable. One could take the approach of Minford and Srinivasan (2009) and impose a terminal condition to create
determinacy in which case the Taylor rule could have a time-varying ination target to accommodate the large swings in
ination. However, resolving these issues and specifying an alternative Taylor rule model for testing against the FTPL
model here lie well outside the scope of this paper.
10
F -test for residuals heteroskedasticity.
4.1.2 Is Fiscal Policy exogenous?
We test the scal policy exogeneity assumption with the following equation
st = +
TX
i=0
idt i + ut (1)
where st is government primary surplus as a percentage to GDP and dt is the debt to GDP ratio.
Both variables are I(1)-conrmed by both ADF and PP tests - Table 5. Thus we test whether the budget
surplus responds to the public debt, with both variables in rst di¤erences Table 6 . There is evidently
no feedback from changes in the debt/GDP ratio onto the primary surplus: this is clear evidence therefore
of a scal regime that is exogenous with respect to the state of the public nances, as assumed in the
FTPL.
Unit root tests st dt
Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF test statistic -2.679 -11.251 -2.920 -1.810
(0.251) (0.000)** (0.172) (0.067)
PP test statistic -0.963 -12.422 -3.051 -7.580
(0.293) (0.0000)** (0.135) (0.000)**
Table 5: Tests for non-stationarity of deseasonalised government surplus and debt - both in GDP ratio
Notes on Table: MacKinnons critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root: values in
parentheses are p-values, while ** indicate signicance at the 1% level. Number of lags in the ADF test
is set upon AIC criterion and PP test upon Newey-West bandwidth.
T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4b -0.001(0.003) 0.001(0.003) 0.000(0.003) 0.000(0.003)b0 0.407(0.215) 0.625(0.255)* 0.544(0.278) 0.497(0.316)b1 -0.020(0.217) -0.046(0.215) -0.221(0.268) -0.368(0.306)b2 - 0.401(0.251) 0.396(0.267) 0.448(0.319)b3 - - -0.165(0.262) -0.258(0.292)b4 - - 0.167(0.297)
F -test on joint signicance (p-value) 0.19 0.13 0.43 0.54
S.E.of regression 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Misspecication tests (p-values)
F -AR 0.25 0.30 0.44 0.01
F -ARCH 0.66 0.16 0.23 0.56
Normality 0.93 0.03 0.08 0.24
F -Het 0.64 0.83 0.13 0.13
Table 6: Fiscal policy exogeneity test- standard errors in parenthesis *=signicant at 5
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Notes to table: Misspecication tests are carried out. F -AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F -test for
residual serial correlation up to forth order. F -ARCH is an F -test for autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity. Norm is normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque test for residuals non-normality. F -Het is
F -test for residuals heteroskedasticity.
5 Can FTPL account for the trend in ination?
Our theory above implies that there is a cointegrating relation between ination and the other arguments
of (8): if one integrates (8) one obtains:
(8a)t = gt + rt   tt + c
While both tt and rt are in principle random walks, we found empirically that tt was constant during
this period. As for rt again it is entirely possible that permanent real interest rates moved little. Thus it
is likely that the only non-stationary variable on the right hand side that moves substantially is gt. If so
one would expect government spending and ination to be cointegrated. Figure 2 compares the pattern
of ination (t) and public spending (gt): both are I(1) variables and plainly share some similarities in
behaviour. We examine the relationship with an Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration test Table 7.
The stationarity of the estimated cointegrating vector bcv = t   b  bgt is established on ADF and PP
tests, both of which reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. The result suggests there is a strong
positive association between these two as suggested by the theory. Thus the FTPLs implication that
scal trends drive ination is quite consistent with the data.
Engle-Granger(1987) Approach
Estimated equation 1970Q4-1978Q4
t = + gt + "tb -0.065(0.021)**b 0.295(0.064)**
t-ADF test on b"t -4.018
p-value 0.000**
t-PP test on b"t -3.937
p-value 0.000**
S.E.of regression 0.01
Misspecication tests (p-values)
F -AR 0.12
F -ARCH 0.37
Normality 0.49
F -Het 0.04
Table 7: Cointegration Analysis of ination and public expenditure- standard errors in parenthesis **=sig-
nicant at 1
Notes to table: Misspecication tests are carried out. F -AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F -test for
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Figure 2: Patterns of ination (t) and public spending (gt)
residual serial correlation up to forth order. F -ARCH is an F -test for autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity. Norm is normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque test for residuals non-normality. F -Het is
F -test for residuals heteroskedasticity.
6 Ination dynamics: bootstrapping and the method of indirect
inference
We now turn to the dynamics of ination and replicate the stochastic environment for the FTPL model to
see whether our estimated dynamic equations for t could have been generated by this model. This we
do by bootstrapping the model above with their error processes. Meenagh et al. (2009a, 2009c) explain
how this procedure is derived from the method of indirect inference. This method uses an auxiliary
model- such as our time-series representation here - to describe the data - see Smith (1993), Gregory
and Smith (1991, 1993), Gourieroux et al. (1993), Gourieroux and Monfort (1995) and Canova (2005).
The method is used here to evaluate the t of a given structural model (rather than for estimation).
This is relevant as here, when we are interested in the behaviour of a structural model whose structure
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is rather precisely specied by the theory.
The idea of this evaluation is to create pseudo data samples - here 1000 - for ination. We randomly
draw i:i:d: shocks in our error processes with replacement; we then input them into their error processes
and these in turn into the model to solve for the implied path of ination over the sample period. We
then run ARMA regressions of the ination rst di¤erence on all the pseudo-samples to derive the
implied 95% condence intervals for all the coe¢ cient values found. Finally we compare the ARMA
coe¢ cients estimated from the actual data to see whether they lie within these 95% condence intervals:
under the null hypothesis these values represent the sampling variation for the ARMA coe¢ cients which
are generated by the model. The portmanteau Wald statistic - the 95% condence limit for the joint
distribution of the ARMA parameters- is also computed. The Wald statistic is derived from the bootstrap
joint distribution of the ARMA parameters under the null hypothesis that the structural model holds.
For the particular case of anARMA(0; 0) we use the joint distribution of the coe¢ cients of anARMA(1; 1)
to check whether it encompasses the two zero coe¢ cients found in the data.
Figure 3 below illustrates the method for two parameters in the auxiliary equation such as in an
ARMA(1,1). The bootstrap distribution of these two parameters under the null are shown for two cases:
one where the two parameter estimates are uncorrelated, the other where they are highly correlated (with
a coe¢ cient of 0.9). The typical situation is one where they are correlated. One can think of estimation
via indirect inference as changing the parameters of the structural model, thus changing the implied
distribution, so as to push the observed data point as far into the centre of the distribution as possible.
The test however takes the structural parameters (and hence the bivariate distribution) as given and
merely notes the position of the observed data point (here given as 0.1 and 0.9) in the distribution. The
Wald statistic is computed as this position expressed as a percentile; thus for example 96 indicates that
the observed parameter estimates lie on the 96% contour, ie in the 95% rejection region.
6.1 The Indirect Inference Results
We now use the FTPL equation above for t and bootstrap the random components of these g and
 processes (since tt is a constant, it drops out on rst-di¤erencing). We obtain 1000 pseudo-samples of
t then run an ARMA on each of these samples to generate the distribution of the ARMA parameters.
The Wald statistic then tests the model at the 95% level of condence on the basis of the complete set
of ARMA parameters.
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Figure 3: Bivariate Normal Distributions (0.1, 0.9 shaded) with correlation of 0 and 0.9.
6.1.1 Test results
Next we use the bootstrapped samples to compare the model with the data on its dynamic aspects -
here the coe¢ cients of the ARMA for t. Of course we have already established that g is a pure
random walk and that ination is close to that too, which suggests that the model will generate similar
dynamics. We run 1000 ARMA regressions on the pseudo-samples to derive the implied 95% condence
intervals for both AR andMA coe¢ cients. Then we compare the ARMA coe¢ cients estimated from the
observed data to see whether they lie within these 95% condence intervals. The Wald-statistic is derived
from the bootstrap distribution of the ARMA parameters under the null hypothesis of the model. The
Wald-statistic (Meenagh 2009a, 2009c) is calculated using the following formula
(b   )0P 1 (b   )0
where,
P 1
 is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of b;the ARMA parameter vector here
generated by the bootstrap ( is the mean of the bootstrap distribution). We arrange the values in
ascending order and get the 5% critical percentile value for the model to be accepted as a whole. Table
9 lists the results of this exercise. We rst show the ARMA(1; 1) case for illustration in Table 8.
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) -0.371 -0.936 0.913 IN
MA(1) 0.512 -1.052 1.379 IN
Wald statistic 16.9
Table 8: Condence Limits of rst-di¤erenced ination process for Theoretical ARMA(1,1)
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If we disregard theARMA(3,3) as unstable, Table 9 reports that the Wald statistics for all theARMAs
lie inside the 95% bounds. Detailed test results can be found in Appendix C. The more elaborate the
dynamics that are estimated, the closer the model gets to being rejected; but this is a normal occurrence
with indirect inference. The DSGE models impose stringent theoretical assumptions on behaviour, so
that the more complex the representation of the datas behaviour the less well does the model replicate
that behaviour. Here we nd the model very easily encompasses the random walk but encompasses less
well the more complicated dynamic schemes that can be found in the data.
Wald Statistic
ARMA(0,0) 0.01
ARMA(1,1) 16.9
ARMA(1,2) 21.9
ARMA(1,3) 76.8
ARMA(2,0) 85.7
ARMA(2,1) 67.5
ARMA(2,2) 45.2
ARMA(2,3) 58.7
ARMA(3,0) 80.2
ARMA(3,1) 94.3
ARMA(3,2) 84.3
Table 9: Wald Statistics for variety of ARMA representations
7 What other dynamic factors could be a¤ecting ination?
We have seen from the above that our theoretical model does replicate the dynamic behaviour of ination.
It is worth noting however, that it does so when the models structural error, t, in equation (8) is included
as implied by the model and the data. This error, which has the interpretation of omitted variables, we
nd to be serially correlated which implies that the theory above only works approximately because if it
were exact then this error would serially uncorrelated. In the rest of this section we explore what these
omitted inuences on ination may have been.
We begin by carefully identifying the time-series properties of this error. Note that since "t, the error
in the cointegrating equation (8a), is stationary, the error in the dynamic equation (8), t = "t, is also
stationary but will in general not be i:i:d:, rather an ARMA process. Estimating it we nd indeed that
this is the case - Table 10. If we ignore ARMAs with roots outside the unit circle (asterisked) we nd
that the best relationship is ARMA(1,3).
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AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) MA(1) MA(2) MA(3) AIC R
2
ARMA(1,1) 0.115 - - 0.262 - - -6.166 0.101
ARMA(1,2) -0.695 - - 1.422 0.774 - -6.352 0.274
ARMA(1,3) -0.479 - - 1.139 0.313 -0.394 -6.363 0.302
ARMA(2,0) 0.408 -0.181 - - - - -6.152 0.118
ARMA(2,1) 1.264 -0.417 - -0.955 - - -6.133 0.126
ARMA(2,2) 1.107 -0.272 - -0.779 -0.190 - -6.082 0.107
ARMA(2,3) 0.144 0.507 - 0.439 -0.611 -0.819 -6.295 0.297
ARMA(3,0) 0.392 -0.141 -0.114 - - - -6.062 0.096
ARMA(3,1) -0.364 0.190 -0.411 0.979 - - -6.279 0.293
ARMA(3,2)* 0.098 0.665 -0.460 0.858 -0.990 - -6.665 0.533
ARMA(3,3)* 0.315 0.794 -0.440 1.527 -1.215 -2.120 -7.555 0.813
Table 10: ARMA Regressions for change in error of cointegrating vector. *= AR or MA roots outside
unit circle
What now interests us is what lagged factors are inuencing this error; current factors we know include
all the innovations in the shocks to the economy. Our method of investigation is to regress this error
as an Error Correction Mechanism on a variety of candidate variables that could inuence the dynamics
of ination via the usual channels of aggregate demand and supply that are omitted from the models
ination determination. Signicant factors could suggest ways the model could be enriched dynamically
in future versions. The signicance of both the i and  Table 11 suggest the presence of dynamic
e¤ects on ination that the model does not capture; there is rather rapid error correction and positive
reaction to lagged interest rate rises. Thus the models dynamics could be enriched in ways that further
work could investigate. Notice that money growth is insignicant, consistently with our earlier nding
that it is entirely endogenous.
Estimated equation 1970Q4-1978Q4
t = "t = +
PT
i=1 i2Mt i +
PT
i=1 iyt i +
PT
i=1 iRt i   "t 1 + utb -0.000(0.002)b1 0.256(0.188)b1 -0.022(0.050)b1 0.306(0.147)*b2 0.271(0.131)*b -0.587(0.186)**
S.E.of regression 0.01
Misspecication tests (p-values)
F -AR 0.17
F -ARCH 0.35
Normality 0.57
F -Het 0.83
Table 11: Omitted variable test- standard errors in parenthesis *,**= signicant at 5 and 1 respectively
Notes to table: Misspecication tests are carried out. F -AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F -test for
residual serial correlation up to forth order. F -ARCH is an F -test for autoregressive conditional het-
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eroskedasticity. Norm is normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque test for residuals non-normality. F -Het is
F -test for residuals heteroskedasticity.
8 Conclusions
We investigate whether the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level can explain UK ination in the 1970s, a
period in which the government greatly increased public spending without raising taxes and monetary
policy was accommodative; we nd evidence that scal policy behaved exogenously with respect to the
state of the public nances and that money growth behaved entirely endogenously, thus identifying the
policy assumptions of the Fiscal Theory. Its implied model of ination is tested in two ways: for its trend
using cointegration analysis and for its dynamics using the method of indirect inference. We nd that
it is not rejected. We also nd that the models errors indicate omitted dynamics which merit further
research.
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Figure 4: Patterns of Government Primary Suplus-to-GDP ratio and Debt-to-GDP ratio.
AppendixA Data and Sources
- Ination: dened as the Consumer Price Level (CPI) deator, Nominal Total Consumption (NTC)Real Total Consumption (RTC)
- Government Expenditure: Total Managed Expenditure excludes debt interest payment. (TME=
Total current expenditure + Net Investment +Depreciation)
- Government Revenue: Total Current Receipts
- GDP: Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted
- Nominal Interest Rate: Sterling certicates of deposit: 3 months: bid rate: end period observation
- Money Supply M4: Money Stock M4 (end period), Level, Seasonally adjusted
- Primary Surplus: Di¤erence between Government Expenditure and Revenue - Figure 4
- Debt: Public Sector Finances Net Debt (data is unavailable in quarterly frequency, authors convert)
- Figure 4
Source: UK O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS) databank
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AppendixB Derivation of Government budget constraint
The government budget constraint gives us
Bt+1
Rt
= Gt   Tt +Bt + BtRt
Where,
Gt is the government spending in money terms,
Tt is the government taxation in money terms,
Rt is the amount of nominal interest the government must pay. The value of the bonds outstanding
is B  1R .
We can derive an expression for government budget constraint in the forward direction by substituting
forwards for future bonds outstanding, yields
Bt
Rt
=
P1
i=0 (Tt+i  Gt+i) 1(1+Rt)i+1
If Tt+i and Gt+i are growing with money GDP ,
i.e. Tt+i = ttPt+iyt+i
Gt+i = gtPt+iyt+i
Bt
Rt
=
P1
i=0
(tt gt)Pt+iyt+i
(1+Rt)
1+i
=
P1
i=0
(tt gt)Ptyt(1++t)i
(1+Rt)
1+i (note that real output grows at rate )
= (tt   gt)Ptyt
P1
i=0
(1++t)
i
(1+Rt)
1+i
= (tt   gt)Ptyt
P1
i=0
(1++t)
1+i
(1+Rt)
1+i(1++t)
If  and t are both small enough,P1
i=0
(1++t)
1+i
(1+Rt)
1+i =
P1
i=0

1
1+Rt  t
1+i
=

1
1  1
1+r
t 
  1

=

1
rt 

Hence, BtRtPtyt =
(tt gt)
(1++t)(rt ) .
AppendixC Details of Indirect Inference tests
AppendixC.1 ARMA(1,2)
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) 0.270 -0.929 0.902 IN
MA(1) -0.296 -1.215 1.233 IN
MA(2) -0.310 -0.586 0.917 IN
Wald Statistic 21.9
Table 12: Condence Limits of change in ination process for Theoretical ARMA(1,2)
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AppendixC.2 ARMA(1,3)
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) -0.403 -0.947 0.948 IN
MA(1) 0.664 -1.343 1.329 IN
MA(2) -0.351 -0.718 0.739 IN
MA(3) -0.791 -0.872 0.865 IN
Wald statistic 76.8
Table 13: Condence Limits of change in ination process for Theoretical ARMA(1,3)
AppendixC.3 ARMA(2,0)
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) 0.056 -0.361 0.360 IN
AR(2) -0.360 -0.371 0.299 IN
Wald statistic 85.7
Table 14: Condence Limits of change in ination process for Theoretical ARMA(2,0)
AppendixC.4 ARMA(2,1)
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) 0.382 -1.033 1.040 IN
AR(2) -0.367 -0.423 0.344 IN
MA(1) -0.393 -1.060 1.407 IN
Wald statistic 67.5
Table 15: Condence Limits of change in ination process for Theoretical ARMA(2,1)
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AppendixC.5 ARMA(2,2)
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) 0.421 -1.296 1.219 IN
AR(2) -0.463 -0.953 0.713 IN
MA(1) -0.441 -1.529 1.502 IN
MA(2) 0.115 -0.983 2.101 IN
Wald statistic 45.2
Table 16: Condence Limits of change in ination process for Theoretical ARMA(2,2)
AppendixC.6 ARMA(2,3)
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) -0.666 -1.274 1.323 IN
AR(2) -0.312 -0.911 0.745 IN
MA(1) 0.859 -1.584 1.511 IN
MA(2) -0.020 -1.084 1.831 IN
MA(3) -0.597 -0.903 0.938 IN
Wald statistic 58.7
Table 17: Condence Limits of change in ination process for Theoretical ARMA(2,3)
AppendixC.7 ARMA(3,0)
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) -0.003 -0.383 0.364 IN
AR(2) -0.374 -0.382 0.319 IN
AR(3) -0.160 -0.358 0.353 IN
Wald statistic 80.2
Table 18: Condence Limits of change in ination process for Theoretical ARMA(3,0)
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AppendixC.8 ARMA(3,1)
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) -0.835 -0.977 0.995 IN
AR(2) -0.333 -0.466 0.383 IN
AR(3) -0.458 -0.398 0.394 OUT
MA(1) 0.952 -1.468 1.426 IN
Wald statistic 94.3
Table 19: Condence Limits of change in ination process for Theoretical ARMA(3,1)
AppendixC.9 ARMA(3,2)
Model Estimated 95% Condence Interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
AR(1) -0.955 -1.193 1.239 IN
AR(2) -0.432 -0.984 0.743 IN
AR(3) -0.449 -0.449 0.446 OUT
MA(1) 1.094 -1.624 1.568 IN
MA(2) 0.131 -1.099 2.129 IN
Wald Statistic 84.3
Table 20: Condence Limits of change in ination process for Theoretical ARMA(3,2)
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